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Gender Equality and Legal Aid
Services: A Research Agenda for
Institutional Change
MARY JANE MOSSMAN
Introduction: Gender and Legal Aid Services
Legal institutions have always strongly resisted change, and they remain
under suspicion of deeply entrenched and insidious gender bias, hard to
identify and even harder to eradicate. I
Evatt J's assertion about the hidden nature of gender bias focuses attention
on legal institutions generally, and the difficulties in identifying and
eradicating gender bias in the context of law. Her assertion challenges us to
re-examine accepted legal practices and institutions to expose bias which has
been so deeply entrenched that it has become invisible. Such a challenge is
particularly interesting in relation to legal aid services, now an accepted
feature of legal institutions in both Canada and Australia. In such a context,
the question is whether, and in what ways, gender is a factor in current
arrangements for legal aid services. In addition, we may ask whether and how
gender impacts on the achievement of equality objectives for men and women
in the context of legal aid services in both countries.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore Evatt J's challenging
assertion about gender 2 bias in relation to my ongoing research about legal aid
services in Canada. Assuming that gender bias is deeply entrenched in legal
aid practices and institutions in Canada, what kinds of research approaches
can most usefully be adopted to both identify and seek to eradicate gender
bias? Such a question appears to be essentially methodological and may thus
appear to be neutral and objective. By contrast, Evatt J's assertion suggests
that the process of investigation - the ways in which questions are posed -
may be critical to the choice of solutions available; and that even
methodological questions may challenge law's traditional claims to neutrality,
objectivity and impartiality, claims epitomised in the traditional metaphor of
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
The technical and research assistance of Hazel Pollack and Michael Gardner are
gratefully acknowledged, as are the stimulating comments of students in the graduate
seminar at Osgoode Hall Law School, 1992. Funding provided by the Department of
Justice, Canada, for a related project is also acknowledged; this paper, however, represents
the views of the author and not the Department of Justice, Canada.
I Evatt, J, "Foreword" in Graycar, R and Morgan, J, The Hidden Gender of Law (1990) at v.
2 In this paper, I have adopted the word "gender" rather than "sex", a choice which has
generally been adopted by gender bias task forces investigating law and legal processes
both in Canada and in the United States. See also Rhode, D L, Justice and Gender: Sex
Discrimination and the Law (1989) at 5.
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justice: the blindfolded woman holding the scales of justice. In such a context,
an assessment of gender bias as a possible factor in legal aid services
implicitly challenges the validity of law's claim to impartial justice for men
and women.
As Evatt suggested, the tasks of identifying and eradicating gender bias in
law and legal processes are difficult because of the "hidden ' 3 nature of such
bias and because of resistance on the part of legal institutions. In this context,
two related legal developments in Canada have encouraged ongoing
challenges to law's traditional claims to ungendered justice. One is the impact
of feminist critiques of law and legal processes, critiques which have
reformulated ways of asking questions about gendered societal experiences
and explored connections between law and such experiences. The other
related development is the increasing acceptance in Canadian courts of a
concept of equality which takes account of more substantive, rather than
merely formal, ideas about equality goals. Thus, this assessment of the impact
of gender bias on current arrangements for legal aid services is an important
part of the overall task of assessing gender bias in legal institutions in
Canada.4 Moreover, because of the continuing connections between Canada
and Australia in the development of legal aid services over the past two
decades, such an assessment may have significance for ongoing research
about legal aid services in Australia as well.
This paper explores a framework for posing research questions about
gender bias and legal aid services. It first identifies some conceptual themes of
feminist analyses of law and legal processes and then outlines feminist
concepts of gender equality and the ways in which some of these ideas have
been incorporated in the decisions of Canadian courts in recent years. These
themes provide the conceptual framework for examining the significance of
gender bias in relation to two aspects of current arrangements for legal aid
services. One is the issue of "coverage" and the impact of a scheme of
categorical entitlement to legal aid services on objectives of (gender) equality
for such services. The second issue, addressed more briefly, focuses on who
provides legal aid services to men and women recipients. In relation to both
issues, the paper tries to identify the kinds of research questions which might
further our understanding of gender bias in legal aid services and our efforts
to eradicate it.
3 As Evatt J observed, "(The analysis] brings to light a society permeated by gender bias, a
society in which women's role, women's work, and women's contribution are not given
their full value and which has failed to protect women from male violence and oppression.
The message is that the legal system incorporates this bias and helps to perpetuate it."
(emphasis added). Above ni at v.
4 The idea of gender bias in legal institutions has been addressed recently by Task Forces in
both the United States and Canada. For a review of the American work, see Wilder, N J,
"Identifying and Correcting Judicial Gender Bias" and Schafran, L H, "The Success of the
American Program", both in Martin, S and Mahoney, K, (eds) Equality and Judicial
Neutrality (1987). In Canada, the Canadian Bar Association has created a gender bias task
force, as have a number of judicial and legal professional associations; see, eg, Law
Society of Upper Canada, Transitions (1990); and Brockman, J and Chunn, D, (eds)
Investigating Gender Bias in Law: Socio-Legal Perspectives (1993).
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In exploring the research agenda about gender bias and legal aid services, it
also seems important to try to "re-vision" more imaginatively our ideas of
"access" and "justice", and the role of legal aid services in accomplishing
gender equality objectives in such a context. Thus, the paper also presents
some alternative research approaches which would transform current legal aid
arrangements by re-visioning gender equality objectives for legal aid services.
Feminist Analyses and Ideas about Equality
Feminist analyses, both in law and in the context of other disciplines,
represent a broad range of theoretical perspectives 5 and differing, and
sometimes controversial, points of view. 6 For purposes of this paper,
however, there are a number of features which are common to most feminist
analyses and which can be usefully adopted as a way of assessing the issue of
gender bias in legal aid services. In particular, this paper identifies three such
features which are particularly relevant to an assessment of the impact of
gender in the context of legal aid services: neutrality and the legal status quo;
the law's division between public and private; and an experience-based
methodology.
Neutrality and the status quo
There is a tendency in traditional legal scholarship to view the status quo as
unbiased or neutral. This is the logical place for feminist analysis to begin -
as an explicit challenge to the notion of bias, as contrasted with the concepts
of perspective and position. Feminist legal theory can demonstrate that what
is is not neutral. What is is as 'biased' as that which challenges it, and ...
there can be no refuge in the status quo.7
As suggested by this quotation, one of the central features of feminist
analyses of law is a critical perspective which challenges the neutrality of the
status quo. According to this analysis, our current legal arrangements have
resulted from choices about values and norms appropriate to defined (or
assumed) objectives for the legal system. Thus, feminist analyses attempt to
reveal the underlying rationales for existing choices in the legal system,
undermining claims to neutrality and challenging the inevitability of the status
quo; in doing so, feminist analyses strive to create the possibility of
alternatives which take (more) account of the gendered experiences of men
and women, both in the legal system and in other societal roles. In doing so,
feminist analyses suggest that "what was accepted as natural is made strange"
5 For an overview of Canadian feminist writing see Boyd, S and Sheehy, E, "Feminist
Perspectives on Law: Canadian Theory and Practice" (1986) 2 CJWL 1; in the USA, see
Scales, A, "Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1981) 56 Ind L/ 375.
6 Differences may result from different ideological starting points or from differing
conceptions of the role of law and its usefulness as an instrument for social change. In
Canada, see Boyd, S and Sheehy, E, above n5; and Sheehy, E and Boyd, S, "Feminist
Perspectives on Canadian Law: An Annotated Bibliography of Interdisciplinary Writings"
(1989) 17 Resources for Feminist Res.
7 Fineman, M A, and Thomadsen, N S, (eds) At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and
Legal Theory (1991) at xiii. See also Fineman, M A, "Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship" (1990) 42 Fla LR 25.
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because of the "realisation that beneath the accepted order of life lie hidden
[and gendered] power relations" .8
The idea of hidden power relations, especially hidden and gendered power
relations, has attracted special concern in feminist legal theory. Carol Smart
has suggested, for example, that the "very core of law - the means by which
law is differentiated from other forms of knowledge - is gendered", 9 a view
which accepts law as essentially a social construction and one which must
inevitably reflect the dominant views of society. While such a viewpoint
reinforces feminists' claims about the absence of neutrality and impartiality in
law, it also provides a difficult problem for those who wish to use law to
achieve societal change. For if law is itself a representation of dominant
societal interests, it may be relatively powerless to transform society; instead,
as Martha Fineman has suggested, "while law can be used to highlight the
social and political aspects it reflects, it is more a mirror than a catalyst when
it comes to effecting enduring social change". 10
The relationship between feminist analyses about the law's claim to
neutrality and, on the other hand, feminist perspectives about the usefulness of
law in achieving social change in the interests of women is a complex one.
For some feminist theorists, the relationship is one which suggests a need to
focus less on "formal" judicial decision-making and more on the role of law
in administrative decision-making;11 while for others, it suggests a need to
combine legal and political activity to accomplish desired changes. 12 This
diversity of perspectives and strategic approaches also underlines the
evolutionary nature of feminist analyses, a feature which results from
feminism's fundamental commitment to continual questioning about
apparently neutral arrangements which create distinctions in the experiences
of men and women.13 For purposes of this paper, it is equally important to
note the diversity of perspectives within current feminist analyses, as well as
these common concerns about law's claims to neutrality and the legitimacy of
the status quo.
8 O'Donovan, K, Sexual Divisions in Law (1985) at 59. See also Scales, A C,"The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" (1985-86) 95 Yale LI 1373.
An excellent overview of the impact of feminist analysis on a number of different
academic disciplines (not including law) in Canada is found in Knowledge Reconsidered:
A Feminist Overview (1984). For recent analyses of feminist legal theory, see Devlin, R,
ed, Feminist Legal Theory (1991).
9 Smart, S, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989) at 20. See also Smart, "Feminism and
Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy" (1986) 14 Int'l J Soc L 109. For a
different approach, see Dahl, T S, "Taking Women as a Starting Point: Building Women's
Law" (1986), 14 Int'l J Soc L 239; and Dahl, T S, Women's Law: An Introduction to
Feminist Jurisprudence (1988).
10 Fineman and Thomadsen, above n7 at xiv.
1 I See, eg, Carol Smart's suggestion that: "It is important to recognize the power that accrues
to law through its claim to truth, but law is both more and less than this in practice."
Above n9 at 22. See also Dahl, above n9.
12 For example, Fineman and Thomadsen, above n7.
13 See Wishik, H R, "To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence"
(1985) 1 Berkeley Women's LJ 64.
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The law's division between public and private
There is a correspondence between sexual divisions and the disjunction of
public and private. The partition of persons into two categories, female and
male, is based on biology and the seemingly natural, [even though] ideas
about the natural vary from age to age ... So it is with ideas concerning the
divergence of public and private. The boundary between spheres regulated
by law and the unregulated shifts over time and in accordance with cultural,
economic and legal factors.14
The division between "public" and "private" spheres has been traced to
early ideas of legal philosophy, 15 but its importance in current legal theory
derives from the "doctrine of separate spheres" enunciated by late nineteenth
century courts in response to women's claims to participate in public life
along with men. In relation to political rights such as voting16 and standing
for public office,17 and in relation to professional activities such as becoming
lawyers, 18 such claims challenged the male exclusivity of the public sphere.
The law's response to women's claims to participate with men in the public
sphere was well defined in the colourful language of Justice Barker in his
decision denying Myra Bradwell's petition to be admitted as a barrister in
Illinois in 1873:
... the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman... The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution
of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance as well
as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. 19
In so constructing separate spheres of activity for men and women, the law
both regulated and reinforced existing ideas about appropriate roles for men
and women.
The law's division of public and private spheres displayed a number of
important features. One was the absence of equality in terms of the
importance of each sphere: the public sphere in which men participated was
regarded as superior to the private and domestic sphere of the family.20 In
addition to this inequality of spheres, there was also inequality in access to
14 O'Donovan, above n8 at 59.
15 See O'Donovan, above n8 at 21-57.
16 United States v Anthony, 24 Fed Cas 829 (1873).
17 Reference re Meaning of the Word 'Persons' in s 24 of the BNA Act [1928] SCR 276;
Edwards vAGfor Canada [1930] AC 124.
18 In re French (1905) 37 NBR 359; In re French [1912] 1 DLR 80; and Langstaff v Bar of
Quebec (1915) 25 Que KB 11.
19 Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US (16 Wall) 130 (1873). The views expressed by the court were
not unlike those generally accepted by society at the time. Even John Stuart Mill, who was
well-known for his progressive views about the rights of women, considered that equal
rights to education, political life, and the professions could be granted only to single
women without the responsibilities of family. See Okin, S M, Women in Western Political
Thought (1979) at 197 ff.
20 See Teitelbaum, L, "The Legal History of the Family" (1987) 85 Mich LR 1052, a review
of Grossberg, M, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century
America (1985). See also Chused, R, "Gendered Space" (1990) 42 Fla LR 125.
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each because men always moved between spheres while women remained
only in the private; thus, domestic activity in the private sphere was "mediated
to the public sphere by men who move[d] between both [while] women ha[d]
a place only in the private sphere", 21 an arrangement which reinforced
differential (gendered) power relationships. Moreover, women's success in
gaining relatively more access to the public sphere in the twentieth century
may merely confirm that the boundaries of the spheres have shifted; in the
legal profession, for example, there is some evidence that women occupy a
different status than men, suggesting the existence now of "separate spheres"
within the profession. 22
The idea of shifting boundaries between the public and the private is an
important one. As Frances Olsen has demonstrated, the public/private division
has masked policy choices about legal intervention and non-intervention,
reflecting and reinforcing social, political and economic power relationships.
In her view, it is necessary to transcend these boundaries, thereby "increasing
the options available to each individual, and more importantly, allowing the
human personality to break out of the present dichotomised system". 2 3 Thus,
an important feature of feminist analyses is the need to be alert to divisions
between public and private, and the ways in which such divisions may be
used to justify different levels or kinds of legal intervention in relation to
spheres of activity associated with men and women. As has been suggested,
moreover, "the conclusion is that reforms which do not confront the division
between private and public will fail"24 in terms of achieving substantive
gender equality.
An experience-based methodology
In addition to challenging neutrality and the status quo as well as the law's
division of public and private, feminist analyses eschew the idea of abstract,
universal norms in favour of contextualised and experience-based methods of
reasoning. In relation to the idea of the "reasonable person" standard in tort
law, for example, Ann Scales has explained why it is important to take
account of gendered experiences:
Some lawyers cling to the "reasonable person" standard. It is comforting; it
signifies the universal rule of law. It pretends that we are all just folks. That,
however, is exactly the standard's flaw. In pretending that we are all
essentially the same, it ignores the real experiential differences between men
21 O'Donovan, above n8 at 3-4, quoting from Smith, D, "Women, the Family and Corporate
Capitalism" in Stephenson, M, (ed) Women in Canada (1974) at 6.
22 See, eg, the data on the relative positions of male and female lawyers in the same cohorts
in Transitions (1991). For further analysis, see Mossman, "'Invisible' Constraints on
Lawyering and Leadership: The Case of Women Lawyers" (1988) 20 Ottawa LR 567; and
Menkel-Meadow, C, "The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The
'Feminization' of the Legal Profession" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall LI 897.
23 Olsen, F, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983) 96
Harv LR 1497 at 1578. See also Olsen, "The Myth of State Intervention in the Family"
(1985) 18 J L Reform 835; Olsen, "The Politics of Family Law" (1984) 2 Law and
Inequality 1; Rifkin, J, "Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy" (1980), 3 Harv
Women's LJ 83; and Elshtain, J B, Public Man, Private Woman (1981).
24 O'Donovan, above n8 at 159.
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and women. The standard thereby perpetuates the male norm underlying the
reasonable person standard and fails, yet again, to take violence against
women seriously. 25
Similarly, Martha Fineman has reiterated the necessity of doing feminist
theory "as an exercise in the concrete, both by focusing on a specific area of
law and by using empirical information and stories of specific lives"; 26 and
Catharine MacKinnon has identified feminist methodology as one of
"consciousness-raising" about women' s experiences from the perspectives of
their own lives.27
Among feminist scholars, the issue of whether a specific feminist
methodology exists is one about which there is continuing debate. At the same
time, there is general agreement that the focus on the concrete experiences of
women, and the meanings which may be ascribed by women to such
experiences, has altered research styles and shifted the focus from quantitative
to more qualitative inquiries. In the context of research about sexual
harassment, for example, it has been suggested that qualitative methods which
are grounded in contextualised meanings may be more useful than merely
quantitative studies:
The distinction between [traditional] and feminist research is ... found at the
epistemological and methodological levels - what is to be taken as
warrantable knowledge and one's stance towards the practice of research. If
warrantable knowledge includes the subjective, ... then our research must
reflect such feminist methodological principles as reflexivity, empathy and
continued attempts to raise the consciousness of those who are the victims of
sexual harassment's malignant effects ... 28
In addition to an emphasis on women's concrete experiences, such a
methodological approach offers an opportunity to take into account the
differences among women's experiences.
In addition to race, class, and sexual preference, factors such as age, physical
characteristics (including "handicaps" and "beauty" or lack thereof),
religion, marital status, the level of male identification, ... birth order,
motherhood, grandmotherhood, intelligence, rural or urban existence,
responsiveness to change or ability to accept ambivalence in one's personal
life or in society, sources of income (self, spouse or state), degree of poverty
or wealth, and substance dependency, among others, shape how individual
women experience the world.29
25 Scales, A, "Feminists in the Field of Time" (1990) 42 Fla LR 95 at 105.
26 Fineman, above n7 at 28. Fineman notes that such an emphasis on concrete experience
"has had rather honourable nonfeminist adherents, including Robert Merton, Clifford
Geertz and James Boyd White." Ibid. See Merton, "On Sociological Theories of the
Middle Range" in On Theoretical Sociology: Five Essays, Old and New (1967); Geertz,
"Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" in The Interpretation of
Cultures (1973); and White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life" (1985) 52 Univ Chi LR 684.
27 MacKinnon, C, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory"
(1982) 7 Signs 515; and "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635.
28 Brockman, J and Phillippe, D, "The Task Force Approach to Studying Gender Bias in the
Courts: A Consideration of Feminist Methods and Perspectives" (1991) 16 Atlantis (#2)
32 at 44.
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In such a context, a research methodology which is committed to taking
account of women's concrete experiences must recognise differences among
women as well as between women and men, a feature of feminist analyses
which makes universal norms or standards both elusive and inappropriate. In
other words, "theory that arises from the circumstances in which women find
themselves is destined to contain paradoxes", 30 paradoxes which demonstrate
both the inapplicability of traditional (male) legal standards to all women, as
well as the need to examine the context for women in their quite different
circumstances.
Gender equality:feminist theory and the courts
The inadequacies in modern equal protection analysis are not unique to
cases involving gender. However, the particular difficulties that emerge in
sex discrimination contexts stem in part from courts' attachment to
paradigms developed for other objectives... Significant progress toward
gender equality will require ... substantial changes in our legal paradigms
and social priorities. 31
An assessment of gender bias in the legal aid context must take account of
the influence of evolving ideas about gender equality. Significant
contributions to ideas about equality have been made by feminist legal theory,
and by recent judicial decisions in Canada which have focused on equality in
the context of sections 15 and 28 of the Charter.32 Both feminist theorists and
the courts have engaged in a search for new paradigms and priorities in their
efforts to (re)define equality objectives in the context of gender issues. At the
same time, the concept of equality has proved to be somewhat elusive and
even, as has been suggested recently, merely an illusion. 33
Feminist theories of equality have been dominated for a number of years
by concepts of sameness and difference in relation to men and women. For
some theorists, women's claims to benefits and advantages enjoyed by men
depend on assertions that they are similarly situated to men (at least in all
29 Fineman, above n7 ("Challenging Law ...") at 40.
30 Id at 43. Smart has recently argued as well that feminist theory has developed from early
analyses which suggested that law is "sexist" to later theories that law is "male"; she
argued, however, that it would be preferable to reconceptualise these ideas in terms of law
as "gendered":
The revised understanding of law as gendered rather than as sexist or male has led to a
modified form of enquiry. Instead of asking how law can transcend gender, the more
fruitful question has become, how does gender work in law and how does law work to
produce gender? What is important about these enquiries is that they have abandoned the
goal of gender neutrality. Moreover law is now redefined away from being that system
which can impose gender neutrality towards being one of the systems (discourses) that is
productive not only of gender difference, but quite specific forms of polarised difference...
Smart, C, "The Woman in Legal Discourse" (Unpublished paper, 1991) at 7.
31 Rhode, above n2 at 82.
32 These sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms include the guarantees of
equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex; s15 includes protection on other
grounds as well. For detailed analysis, see Bayefsky, A and Eberts, M, (eds) Equality
Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985).
33 Fineman, M, The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (1991).
Fineman's book addressed divorce reform specifically, but her concerns about using
equality concepts in legal claims on behalf of women also have more general significance.
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relevant respects); 34 while for others, such claims depend on assertions of
differences between women and men, differences such as the possibility of
pregnancy which mandate special rules to take account of inherently different
needs. 35 As has been recognised, the problem of an approach to equality
which focuses on either sameness or difference is that they both reinforce
men as the standard to which women are compared; thus, whether women are
regarded as the same as men, or different from them, the standard for
comparison is men.
Partly to overcome the dilemma inherent in such a sameness/difference
approach to equality, Catharine MacKinnon has proposed a theory of equality
which focuses on dominance rather than difference. According to
MacKinnon, "an equality question is a question of the distribution of power,
... specifically of male supremacy and female subordination". 36  This
approach to equality is critical of current societal arrangements, many of
which cannot be challenged by the sameness/difference approach because
only women (and not women and men) are affected by them; according to
MacKinnon:
The goal of this dissident approach is not to make legal categories trace and
trap the way things are. It is not to make rules that fit reality. It is critical of
reality. Its task is not to formulate abstract standards that will produce
determinate outcomes in particular cases... It proposes to expose that which
women have had little choice but to be confined to, in order to change it. 37
Such an approach to equality is less traditional than that of sameness and
difference; for this reason, Wendy Williams has suggested that MacKinnon's
approach may be "too nakedly substantive and political to be acceptable to a
judiciary deeply invested in viewing itself as neutral and non-interventionist"
and that for judges, "the idea of equality is necessarily one of equivalence"
and the task one of "comparing men and women". 38
Such a critique highlights the ways in which conceptions of equality are
closely linked to the kinds of societal changes which are being sought, and the
extent to which gender inequality is understood as a matter of systemic
discrimination. In her analysis of equality, Deborah Rhode has also noted the
limits of an approach based on ideas of dominance and submission, both
because they do not sufficiently capture the nuances of inequality among men
and women in differing contexts and also because such a formulation is
generally less well-known to legal discourse. By contrast, she has argued for
an approach which takes account of disadvantage:
34 In the context of sex equality litigation in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States, see
Williams, W, "The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism"
(1982) 7 Women's Rts LR 182; and "American Equality Jurisprudence" in Martin and
Mahoney, (eds) above n4 at 115.
35 See Wolgast, E, Equality and the Rights of Women (1980) who argued for equal rights and
also for special rights for women; the latter were particularly directed to arrangements for
pregnancy and breast-feeding. See also Scale, A, "Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence"
above n5.
36 MacKinnon, C, "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination" in Feminism
Unmodified (1987) at 40.
37 Ibid.
38 Williams, W, "American Equality Jurisprudence" above n34 at 122.
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Disadvantage invites a dialogue about consequences, not motivations; it can
speak in terms of statistical facts and frequencies that take account of
differences as well as commonalities among women. Such a framework
avoids sweeping causal claims about gender hierarchies that in legal settings
are often unnecessary and unproductive. There is less conceptual
commitment to identifying agents of oppression, and less risk of
understating women's opportunities for social influence and social change.
As a strategy for enlisting support among men as well as women,
disadvantage has some clear advantages. Its rhetoric is less likely to deflect
attention from the fact of inequality and the social initiatives necessary to
address it.39
She has explored the idea of equality as disadvantage in the context of a
number of current issues for women in the United States and concluded that
such an approach is more useful than either the sameness/difference approach
or the dominance approach. As she has stated, "the central question in
discrimination cases should not be whether gender is relevant, but how to
make it less so".40
This trend away from abstract equality concepts to more instrumental
approaches has also been evident in the work of some Canadian feminist
theorists. In relation to interpreting the Charter, for example, Kathleen Lahey
has suggested the adoption of a theory of inequality, an approach which
would "require judges to ask whether the rule or practice that is being
challenged contributes to the actual inequality of women ... ."41 This approach
is similar to Diana Majury's suggestion that "it is in women's interest to
refuse to subscribe to, or commit themselves to, any single meaning of
equality ... [but rather] to learn to use the equality discourse on behalf of
women in ... many ... diverse situations". 42 Such a suggestion underlines the
primary commitment of feminist theorists to the goals they are seeking for
women, rather than to abstract conceptions of equality, an approach which
clearly demonstrates feminists' commitments to contextualised experiences
and to challenging the status quo. Significantly, the approaches used by courts
in interpreting the Charter have also shown some acceptance of these more
challenging conceptions of equality.
Prior to the Charter, equality issues in Canada were generally considered in
relation to human rights legislation, enacted in the provinces as well as by the
federal government. Thus, even after the proclamation of section 15 of the
39 Rhode, above n2 at 85. Rhode did not suggest that disadvantage should be adopted as an
exclusive paradigm for equality analysis; and she noted that "for some theoretical,
political and legal purposes, dominance remains a crucial organizing principle; one does
not, for example, speak of rape or pornography as questions of disadvantage". She did,
however, assert a need to take account of context in using equality paradigms and to focus
on when and why to adopt different ones. In her view:
"The choice of formulation is less important than the conceptual commitment that both
imply. Underlying each approach is a sensitivity to patterns of inequality that conventional
legal traditions have failed to address." Ibid.
40 Rhode, above n2 at 318.
41 Lahey, K, "Feminist Theories of (In)Equality" in Martin and Mahoney, (eds) above n4, 71
at 83.
42 Majury, D, "Strategizing In Equality" in Fineman and Thomadsen, (eds) above n7, 320 at
336.
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Charter in 1985, issues of gender equality have continued to be litigated under
human rights legislation as well as in relation to the Charter's guarantees. In
the context of gender equality and legal aid services, there are two aspects. of
these decisions which are of particular importance.
One is the acceptance of an approach to equality which takes account of
substantive outcomes rather than merely formal equality. In decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada about the systemic nature of pregnancy
discrimination (Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd)4 3 and the context of sexual
harassment of women in employment (Janzen v Platy Enterprises Ltd),44 the
court accepted concepts of equality and discrimination which took account of
gendered societal arrangements and the ways in which they created
disadvantages for women. Similarly, the idea of systemic inequality was
recognised in Action Travail des Femmes v CNR45 a claim which was
designed to challenge gendered societal expectations about work for women
and men. More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada took into account
differences in women's experiences of violence in intimate relationships,
fashioning a self-defence remedy for a woman accused in R v Lavallee,
having regard to her different perceptions of "imminent" harm by contrast
with traditional formulations about self-defence in criminal law. 46 All of
these developments arguably demonstrate that Canadian courts (and tribunals)
have increasingly taken (some) account of the impact of gendered experiences
in their equality analyses, whether or not they have been interpreting the
Charter, human rights legislation or other legal principles. In this way, there is
evidence of support for interpretations of equality which go beyond formal
equality guarantees and which take account of a need for more substantive
remedies to achieve gender equality.
The other significant judicial development in equality doctrine was the
acceptance on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada of a definition of
equality which embraced more than the sameness/difference concept
embedded in the traditional "similarly situated" test. In Andrews v Law
Society of British Columbia,47 the court concluded that the legislative
requirement of Canadian citizenship for admission to the legal profession
violated section 15 of the Charter. Focusing on the link in section 15 between
equality guarantees and the discrimination clause, McIntyre J concluded that
equality must be defined by reference to discrimination. Moreover, he
purposefully adopted a definition of discrimination which focused on the idea
of disadvantage:
... a distinction, whether intentional or not ... which has the effect of
imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on [an] individual or group
not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of
society.48
43 (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 321.
44 Idat 352.
45 (1987) 76 NR 161.
46 See R v Lavallee (1990) 108 NR 321.
47 [19891 1 SCR 143.
48 Andrews above n47 at 174-175.
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Similarly, Wilson J referred to the s15 guarantee as designed to protect a
"discrete and insular minority" or a group which is "relatively powerless
politically", 49 language which also emphasised the idea of disadvantage
rather than merely notions of sameness and difference.
The court's choice of language about equality as disadvantage in Andrews
now arguably confines both federal and provincial legislative choices about
entitlement to legal aid services in Canada generally. 50 Such an analysis
depends on a comparison of poor litigants with those who have access to
wealth, an unlisted ground of discrimination in s15. For purposes of gender
equality issues in legal aid services, however, the sex equality guarantee of
s15 is explicit, clearly mandating delivery of legal aid services in ways which
do not discriminate between men and women. Moreover, in light of the
interpretation of s15 in the Andrews decision, it is necessary to consider
arrangements for legal aid services in terms of disadvantages for women, and
not merely whether women are similarly situated in relation to men with
respect to such services. Thus, whether or not section 15 mandates legal aid
services for indigent persons generally, the equality guarantee explicitly
confirms that legal aid services which are made available must be provided to
men and women without discrimination; and that the concept of
discrimination must take account of women as a disadvantaged group in
society, rather than focusing (only) on whether women are similarly situated
with men.
On this basis, judicial recognition of equality in terms of outcome or result
(rather than merely formal equality) and the use of disadvantage in
determining issues of discrimination (rather than sameness and difference
using a male standard) define the parameters for assessing gender equality in
relation to legal aid services. Moreover, the convergence of ideas of equality
which take account of gendered disadvantages in both feminist theories of
equality and the definitions adopted by courts creates a context for assessing
gender equality in legal aid services in terms of substantive outcomes or
results. The next section of this paper uses these ideas to explore issues in the
current arrangements for legal aid services in Canada, and the research
approaches which seem necessary to assess Evatt J's assertions about gender
bias in legal practices and institutions.
Gender Bias and Existing Legal Aid Services in Canada
Categorical entitlement is a major feature of legal aid schemes in Canada. In
addition, most provincial legal aid schemes also distinguish between legal
services which are mandatory for financially eligible clients and those which
may be provided to such clients in the discretion of legal aid administrators. 5 1
49 Id n47 at 152.
50 See Mossman, "Civil Legal Aid Services in Canada: Policy Options" (1990) at 57 ff. See
also R v Robinson (1989), 63 DLR (4th) 289 (Alta CA); R v Turpin [1989] 2 SCR 1296;
Reference re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld) [1989] 1 SCR 922; and Hebb v The
Queen (1989) 89 NSR (2d) 137. For an excellent analysis of Robinson, see Schneiderman,
D and Graydon, C, "An Appeal to Justice: Publicly Funded Appeals and R v Robinson; R v
Dolejs" (1990) 28 Alta LR 873.
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On the surface, such a scheme appears gender neutral in terms of legislative
choices about the eligibility of applicants and categories of entitlement. From
the perspective of feminist analyses, however, legal categories which define
rights and obligations may frequently conceal hidden (and gendered) bias:
Legal practitioners have always known that people's lives did not readily fit
into legal categories, but this has not often been reflected in a legal system
which fragments its treatment of people's problems into categories... For
women, these artificial classifications are especially problematic since
women have played no part in defining those categories. It is because of this
exclusion of women from traditional legal scholarship that taking women's
lives as a starting point for any legal analysis requires a fundamental
rethinking of those categories. 52
As this assertion suggests, feminist analyses have consistently challenged
the neutrality of legal categories, either because women were not involved in
defining categories (and their interests may not therefore have been
considered in the defining process) or because their interests may have been
regarded as less important (because of the impact of differential power
relationships among men and women). The quotation also suggests that there
is a need to revise categories, a suggestion which explicitly demands a
research methodology which takes account of women's experiences, and
which also implicitly challenges the inevitability of status quo arrangements
for providing legal aid services. On this basis, it is helpful to explore this idea
of categorical entitlement to legal aid services, using the conceptual
framework outlined above, in order to assess Evatt J's claim about gender bias
in the context of legal aid services.
51 For example, the Legal Aid Act RSO 1990, c L-9 provides that a legal aid certificate "shall
be issued to a person entitled thereto" in relation to proceedings specified in s12 of the
Act. By contrast, s13 provides that a certificate "may be issued" in the discretion of the
area director for other kinds of court proceedings and matters involving administrative
tribunals. As well, s14 provides that a certificate may be issued to a person for appellate
proceedings, subject to the approval of the area legal aid committee. Section 15 specifies
certain proceedings for which no certificate may be issued. Note also that s17 provides for
a determination of the financial eligibility of an applicant for legal aid; s17(4) authorises
the area director to issue a certificate on the basis of a report about financial eligibility
from a welfare officer and "only where in the opinion of the area director the issue of a
certificate is justified".
52 Graycar and Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law above nI at 3. The authors provided a
number of examples of the ways in which legal categories obscure or undermine women's
experiences of reality. In particular, they cited Susan Stefan's critique of the law's
definition of "reproductive rights":
"Rape and child custody are not usually included in the concept of reproductive rights.
This is because the law has a curiously truncated view of these rights. A continuum we
take for granted in 'real' life - sexual intercourse, pregnancy, birth and raising children
- is artificially and significantly divided by law. Often, the concept of reproductive
freedom is applied only to decisions made post-conception and pre-birth. After that, legal
questions around the right to keep the child are referred to under the rubric of 'family
law'."
See Stefan, "Whose Egg is it Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated,
Institutionalized and Incompetent Women" (1989) 13 Nova LR 405 at 407-408.
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Gender neutrality and the status quo
From the perspective of feminist analyses, the first research question involves
the language used in legal aid statutes: do all the statutes in Canada express
entitlement to legal aid services in terms of gender neutral language
("persons") or do some use gender specific language ("men" or "women")?
To the extent that statutes define eligibility for legal aid services according to
gender, they would raise initial questions about gender bias, questions which
would need to be investigated in terms of substantive, not merely formal,
equality goals. 53 Yet, the fact that most of the language in Canadian legal aid
statutes is gender neutral does not foreclose the issue of gender bias. As was
suggested in the context of proposals for eliminating sexism in research:
Language shapes as well as reflects our thinking. Research cannot be
non-sexist unless it uses non-sexist language. However, biases in research
may exist even if the language employed is non-sexist. Appropriate
language is therefore a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for
conducting unbiased research.54
Thus, an assessment of the statutory language used to define entitlement to
legal aid services is a first step, but only a first step, in research about gender
bias and legal aid services.
In addition to gender neutral language, research about legal aid services
must assess whether a scheme of categorical entitlement achieves gender
equality objectives in practice. One way of testing this more substantive factor
is to assess the results of a scheme of categorical entitlement in terms of the
proportion of men and women who qualify for legal aid services each year.
Such an approach suggests that evidence that men qualify for legal aid
services more often than women should raise questions about the substantive
"neutrality" 55 of statutory language about legal aid entitlement. Interestingly,
there is some disparity in different provincial legal aid schemes in Canada
with respect to the proportion of men and women who are entitled to such
services. For example, in provinces where legal aid services are routinely
available in criminal law matters, but much less frequently in family law
matters, there is evidence that a disproportionate number of men qualify for
legal aid services. 56 In this way, gender neutral language may, in fact, "mask"
53 Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years have clearly enunciated ideas of
substantive, and not merely, formal equality; see above nn43-49 and accompanying text.
What remains less clear is how gender specific language which confers benefits on
women, and not on men (gender specific language) is to be accommodated to theoretical
ideas about equality; the interpretation of s15(2) of the Charter is one aspect of this
problem. For an earlier analysis of the ideas of formal and substantive equality, and the
use of gender neutral and gender specific language, see Eberts, M, "Sex and Equality
Rights" in Bayefsky and Eberts, (eds) above n32 at 183.
54 Eichler, M and Lapointe, J, "On the Treatment of the Sexes in Research" (1985) at 15
(emphasis added). See also Eichler, M, Nonsexist Research Methods: A Practical Guide
(1988).
55 For an overview of research from a feminist perspective, and especially ideas about
research in relation to hidden gender bias, see Smith, L, "What is Feminist Legal
Research?" in Tomm, W, (ed) The Effects of Feminist Approaches on Research
Methodologies (1988) 7 1.
56 For some details about the limited availability of legal aid services in civil law matters, see
DPA Group Inc Evaluation of Saskatchewan Legal Aid (1988); and DPA Group Inc
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hidden and gendered preferences for providing legal aid services which are
more frequently required by men.
Research about gender bias and legal aid services thus needs to take
account of the actual rates of usage of legal aid services by men and by
women. In doing so, it may also be important to document not only the
different proportions overall, but also within categories of legal aid schemes;
such differences may be quite important in identifying the kinds of legal
problems for which men and women may seek legal aid assistance. Moreover,
in those schemes which distinguish mandatory services from those which are
discretionary, it may be critical to document any differences in the rates of
eligible men and women. Especially in the context of scarce legal aid
resources, persons whose legal aid needs fall within mandated service
categories will likely receive services, while those whose services lie within
discretionary categories will not. In this way, the categories define preferences
for legal aid services which may not be gender neutral in terms of equal
access by men and women.
Such research about the impact of categories of entitlement for legal aid
services clearly exposes choices which have been made about priorities for
legal aid services, demonstrating that "what is is as 'biased' as that which
challenges it".57 This approach is, moreover, consistent with that of numerous
scholars of legal aid services who have tried to show how choices about legal
aid arrangements are political as well as legal decisions. Richard Abel has
suggested, for example, that serious research about legal aid must take
account of its "inherently political nature". 58 Abel's view is thus consistent
with the approach of feminist analyses which seek to reveal the existence of
choices in defining categorical entitlement to legal aid services, and
particularly the hidden and gendered nature of such choices. 59
Evaluation of Legal Aid in New Brunswick (1986).
More recently, the report of the Family Law Tariff Sub-Committee of the Legal Aid
Committee concluded (among other matters) that "the legal aid budget [in Ontario] is
unequally distributed and favours men's legal problems, primarily criminal, over women's
legal problems, primarily matrimonial." See Legal Aid Bulletin (No 76, June 1992).
57 Fineman and Thomadsen, above n7.
58 Abel, R, "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism" (1985) 32
UCLALR 474 at 476.
For differing analyses of the relation between legal aid and political choices, see
Hazard, G Jr, "Legal Problems Peculiar to the Poor" (1970) 26 J Social Issues 47;
Cashman, P, (ed) Research and the Delivery of Legal Services (1981); Zander, M, Legal
Services for the Community (1978); Cappelletti, Gordley and Johnson, Jr, Toward Equal
Justice: A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modern Societies (1975); Menkel-Meadow,
C, "Legal Aid in the United States: The Professionalization and Politicization of Legal
Services in the 1980's" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ 29; and Hoehne, D, Legal Aid in
Canada (1989).
59 Abel has suggested that groups which struggle with oppression may tum to "legal
instrumentalities", stating that some of the first legal aid programs came about as a means
of overcoming the exploitation of women. Yet, even though there are similarities in the
approach of legal aid scholars and that of feminist analyses, there are also serious flaws in
the work of traditional legal aid scholars from a gender perspective. See also, Johnson, E,
"The Justice System of the Future: Four Scenarios for the Twenty-First Century" in
Cappelletti, M, (ed) Access to Justice and the Weljire State (1981) 183 at 197; as quoted
in Abel, id at 496. For a different analysis, see MacDonald, G, "The Contribution of Social
Science Method to Uncovering Sexism in Law" (1991).
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Yet, when research identifies differences for men and women with respect
to the impact of "neutral" categories of entitlement to legal aid services, the
important question is how such differences can be explained. One approach,
for example, might consider whether there are differences in the ways in
which men and women use legal services for problem-solving generally, and
the role of legal aid for men and women within the legal system overall. Thus,
if legal aid systems are designed according to the pattern of legal services
offered to paying clients, 60 and if men and women participate in different
ways in the use of law for problem-solving, 61 the gendered nature of legal aid
services may need to be understood as part of the larger problem of gendered
law and legal services. Such a conclusion does not detract from the need to
alter existing legal aid arrangements, but it does require an integrated
approach to legal services generally in order to design effective strategies for
achieving gender equality goals for legal aid services.
Beyond the identification of differences in the patterns of use of legal
services generally on the part of men and women, there is also a need to ask
questions about differential needs for legal aid services by men and women.
Thus, while a differential use of legal services in the context of paying clients
might be explained by the relative wealth of men in Canada by comparison
with women,62 such an explanation does not justify differential use of legal
aid services by women; in the latter context, women's greater likelihood of
poverty, relative to men, arguably means that women should utilise legal aid
services more often than men. In this context, women's disproportionately
low rate of use of legal aid services must take account of women's greater
likelihood of poverty, relative to men, but must also seek other explanations
for this apparent contradiction in terms of gendered needs for legal aid
services.
6 3
60 It is at least arguable that initial efforts to provide legal aid services in Canada assumed
that equality for poor clients required that they have access to the same services which
were available to those who could afford to pay; the test adopted was that of the
"reasonable client of modest means". For a more detailed analysis, see Mossman, "Legal
Aid in Canada" (Unpublished paper, 1983); Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on
the Administration of Ontario Courts (1973); and Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid
(1974). These latter reports illustrated the ways in which providing legal aid services
changed and challenged prevailing ideas about the legal needs of poor clients.
61 There is some evidence that legal services are utilised more frequently by men than by
women. In their 1979 study, McKie and Reed concluded that women did not use the civil
courts as frequently as men, suggesting that the underrepresentation of women in the
courts might be the result of "their less than full participation, as a class of persons, in
mainstream activities in this society". See McKie C, and Reed, P, Women in the Civil
Courts (1979) at 20-21. In the context of the criminal courts, women are also represented
significantly less often than men; for details, see Adelberg, E, A Forgotten Minority:
Women in Conflict with the Law (1985), updated statistics.
Clear information about the percentage of women litigants before administrative
tribunals is currently more difficult to assess or not available. See Mossman, "Shoulder to
Shoulder: Gender and Access to Justice" (1991) 10 Windsor YB Access Just 351 at n26.
62 The issue of women's poverty, relative to men, is addressed below. For an interesting
discussion about women's economic status, see Report of the Royal Commission on the
Status of Women in Canada (1970). For a recent assessment of the Commission's
recommendations, see Abner, E, Mossman, M J and Pickett, E, "'A Matter of Simple
Justice': Assessing the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in
Canada" (1990) 22 Ottawa LR 573.
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These research approaches are all informed by feminist concerns for
questioning the neutrality of existing categories of entitlement and willingness
to challenge the status quo. In the legal aid context, however, the issue of
gender bias must confront specifically the significance of the priority
accorded to legal aid for criminal matters by all the legal aid schemes in
Canada. This issue must necessarily be addressed in the context of the
public/private dichotomy and the feminist critique of it.
Legal aid in criminal and civil law matters: public and private
Existing research about legal aid services in Canada has demonstrated some
priority for legal aid services in criminal matters, 64 particularly in the context
of diminishing governmental resources. Although there are some provincial
statutes which define criminal legal aid services within the group of
mandatory services, 65 the priority for legal aid in criminal matters has not
resulted from this statutory preference alone. In practice, the priority accorded
to legal aid for criminal matters has resulted from the existence of
federal-provincial cost-sharing agreements in criminal and young offender
legal aid. According to these agreements, the federal government reimburses
provincial legal aid schemes for 50 per cent of the cost of providing such
services.66 Such a contribution to the funding of provincial legal aid schemes
makes such services more attractive than civil legal aid services in cost/benefit
terms, especially in provinces where funding for legal aid services may be
otherwise scarce.
From a perspective of gender bias research, it is important to question the
rationale(s) for the existing priority for legal aid in criminal matters. In
addition to detailed information about the relative rates for women and men
for legal aid services in criminal and civil matters, and their relative rates of
access for different kinds of criminal law matters, there is a need for
reassessing the philosophical basis for the priority accorded to legal aid in
criminal matters. In doing so, feminist analyses suggest that it is critical to
approach this inquiry without foreclosing the possibility that the categorical
priority for criminal matters is not "neutral" and the need to assess bias in
assertions which reinforce the status quo.
In this context, it is interesting to consider the historical and economic
rationales for according priority to legal aid in criminal law matters, in
addition to philosophical ones. In the historical context, for example, it is
evident that expressed needs for representation in criminal law matters was
63 This issue is addressed below. It has been suggested that women and men may have been
socialised to use different methods of solving problems, including settling disputes and
using legal advice and assistance; see Gilligan, C, In a Different Voice (1982).
64 See Mossman, above nn50 and 60.
65 For example, see above n5 1.
66 For example, Legal Aid Cost-Sharing Agreement, Canada and Ontario (1987-88) Part I
and Schedule B. See also "Legal Aid in Criminal Cases" in Study Team Report to the
Task Force on Program Review, Improved Program Delivery: Justice System (1986).
By contrast, there is less funding available for legal services in civil matters (including
family law), although provinces have been able to seek some funding pursuant to the
Canada Assistance Plan. In recent years, however, the federal government has altered the
terms of this legislation unilaterally.
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not the sole impetus for the creation of provincial legal aid schemes, although
such representation was frequently cited as one of the important reasons for
doing so. 6 7 In such a context, moreover, there is little historical research
which documents the extent to which the needs of poor women, by contrast
with poor men, were (or were not) considered, in relation to both criminal and
civil legal aid services. Significantly, it may also be important for historical
research to assess changes in criminal and civil laws since the introduction of
legal aid schemes to take account of the ways in which such changes may
have affected the need for representation by men and women in different legal
contexts.
From an economic perspective, moreover, there is some evidence that
changes in the blend of criminal and civil legal aid services in provincial
schemes have coincided with the negotiation of federal-provincial
cost-sharing agreements; there is little evidence which suggests that such
changes have occurred as a result of changes in philosophical rationales for
legal aid services.68 In this context, it is arguable that the current priority for
legal aid in criminal matters (or at least the extent of the current priority) is
based on economic and historical factors rather than on immutable
philosophical values. Thus, feminist analyses reinforce the contingency of
historical and economic choices in current arrangements which accord
significant priority to legal aid services in criminal law matters.
More importantly, gender bias research needs to take account of the impact
of the law's traditional dichotomy between the public and private spheres.
Thus, to the extent that legal aid may be generally more available in criminal
matters (the "public" realm) than in family law matters (the "private" realm),
for example, the preference accorded to criminal law in legal aid schemes may
correspond to the ways in which the public/private distinction in law has
traditionally excluded and disadvantaged women. In this context, it is
important to reassess the philosophical rationales for the priority accorded to
legal aid services in criminal matters.
These rationales suggest that the criminal law priority is justified for two
reasons: one is the disparity of resources involved when the state is a party to
the adversary proceedings against an accused person. The other is the
seriousness of the possible consequences of the proceedings for the accused,
including imprisonment. From the perspective of gender bias research, it is
useful to identify other circumstances in which the state is the other party to
the proceedings and in which there are serious consequences for an individual,
including loss of liberty. For example, in committal proceedings for
psychiatric patients; in hearings to determine the status of refugee claimants;
and in child protection cases, one party to the proceedings is the state; and the
67 As was noted in the report recommending the establishment of the Ontario Legal Aid
Plan, there seemed to be no reason to exclude family law matters from legal aid
entitlement: "In the contemplation of the law of Ontario they are equal.... Any legal aid
system which intends to ensure the advancement of the protection of the legal rights of the
needy must surely include matrimonial causes."
See Report of the Joint Committee on Legal Aid (1965) at 65.
68 See, eg, the evaluations of legal aid programs in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick,
above n56.
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consequences may involve loss of liberty in the form of indeterminate
committal for psychiatric patients, deportation (and consequential disadvant-
ages) for refugee claimants who are unsuccessful, and loss of "liberty" for
children who are taken from their parents in child protection hearings. For
these litigants, as for those charged with criminal offences, there are
disparities of resources and serious consequences.
In most Canadian provinces, access to the resources of provincial legal aid
schemes for criminal matters and for other matters with these similar features
would not be the same. To the extent that access is unequal, moreover, it is
also possible that those denied access include substantial numbers of women
(for example, psychiatric patients and mothers in child protection cases).
Thus, it is arguable that the rationale for according priority to legal aid
services in criminal law matters masks a preference which is not neutral in
terms of its results for men and women who seek legal aid assistance. Such a
conclusion might suggest a need to extend legal aid services to all those
matters in which there is a disparity of resources because the state is a party to
the proceedings and where the consequences are serious for the individual
litigant in terms of loss of liberty or livelihood.
Feminist analyses of the law's division between public and private spheres
may also be used to probe more deeply to question the relative values attached
to the consequences of criminal law and family law matters. What are the
unstated values in a scheme which always regards the consequences of
possible imprisonment as more significant than the loss of custody of one's
children, a distinction which could result in an accused person receiving legal
aid in criminal proceedings while a mother is denied legal aid in a custody
action? Such choices seem to be affected by traditional value choices about
the public/private dichotomy and which have significant impact on societal
policies without careful scrutiny.
In using feminist analyses to probe these underlying rationales, moreover,
it is also useful to consider the mutability of the boundaries between public
and private spheres. In doing so, there is an opportunity to question the
rationale for differential treatment by legal aid schemes of disparity of
resources between litigants: why do legal aid schemes readily accept disparity
of resources as a justification for giving priority to legal aid clients in criminal
law matters, while rejecting disparity of resources as irrelevant in determining
eligibility for women who become involved in family law disputes with their
more affluent husbands? Is it the fact of disparity of resources or the assumed
proportion of the disparity? Moreover, is the disparity of state resources in
criminal matters as real in practice as in theory in the context of court
congestion, backlogs of cases and overworked court officials, including
prosecutors? By contrast, an affluent husband with a well-prepared and
well-paid lawyer acting for him may enjoy proportionately greater legal
resources than his impecunious wife in a family law case. Such analysis
probes the "neutrality" of the public/private dichotomy which distinguishes
the disparity of resources available to litigants in criminal and family law
cases; in practice, this disparity reveals needs for legal aid for women in
family law cases which are just as great as those of men in criminal matters. 69
The idea of the division of public and private spheres also affects gender
bias research which focuses on those women who are represented in the
public, criminal law sphere in relation to legal aid services. In this context, the
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research issue is whether the priority accorded to legal aid in criminal law
matters benefits women to the same extent as men. Such research requires an
examination of the nature of crimes in which women are involved, by contrast
with men, and the ways in which the categories of entitlement for legal aid in
criminal law matters may benefit men and women differentially. 7 0 Such
research might be linked to current research about differential treatment of
men and women in the criminal justice system, including the process of
sentencing and incarceration. As Shelley Gavigan has suggested, women's
unequal status in society has influenced the results for men and women in the
criminal law process, particularly in relation to sentencing:
Mary Eaton illustrates that if one posed the question in terms of 'differential
treatment', one missed the subtle processes by which gender divisions are
reproduced by the courts. Eaton found that men and women defendants who
were guilty of the same offences, and who were in the same circumstances
(e.g. single, no previous criminal record) received the same sort of sentence.
However, she found that men and women defendants were rarely in the
same circumstances. Both Eaton and Carol Smart argue that criminologists
should research the unexamined assumptions of the courts and lawmakers
about women's sexuality and women's place in society.71
69 The relative priority for legal aid services in criminal law, rather than family law, cases
has been addressed in the context of legal aid services in the United States as follows:
"One would expect that a system sensitive to client needs to respond to [the increase in
marriage breakdown] by spending a larger proportion of its resources on the problems of
family breakdown. As family breakdown has become a major cause of poverty, family
legal problems have taken on even greater importance. Instead, at a time when the poverty
caused by family breakdown is at an all-time high, LSC programs seem to be spending
less time on family matters ... This does not mean that the other legal issues are
unimportant, simply that family issues loom large as the ones that shape the lives of the
poor. Is it unreasonable to expect legal services providers' to reflect this reality?"
See Besharov, D, "Legal Services for the Poor: Time for Reform" Conference on Access
to Justice in the 1990s (1989) at 31. See also Besharov, D, "The Feminization of Poverty:
Has Legal Services Failed to Respond?" (1990-91) 24 Clearinghouse R 210; Woods, L,
"Challenges Facing Legal Services in 1990s: Perspectives of Women and Family Law
Advocates" (1988) 22 Clearinghouse Rev 457.
For a review of equality issues in the context of family law in Canada, see Busby,
Fainstein and Penner, (eds) Equality Issues in Family Law (1990). For a critique of gender
equality in the context of housing policies and homelessness, see Parkdale Community
Legal Services, "Homelessness and the Right to Shelter" (1988) 4 J Soc Pol 33, especially
at 72 ff; and in the context of welfare, see Stairs, F, "Sole Support Mothers and
Opportunity Planning in the Thomson Report" (1989) 5 J Soc Pol 165.
70 Where legal aid statutes provide for mandatory entitlement for indictable offences, and
discretionary entitlement for summary conviction offences, for example, the kinds of
crimes committed by men and by women will result in different bases for entitlement at
least and may also result in some dissentitlement to legal aid services; in this way, the
characterisation of offences as indictable or summary conviction, and possible gender
biases in such characterisation, are reinforced by the categorisation adopted by legal aid
schemes. See Adelberg, E, above n61, for current statistics on this issue.
Some interesting questions about women in the criminal justice system are also raised in
Heidensohn, F, "Models of Justice: Portia or Persephone? Some Thoughts on Equality,
Fairness and Gender in the Field of Criminal Justice" (1986) 14 Int'l J Soc L 287.
71 Gavigan, S, "Women's Crime: New Perspectives and Old Theories" in Adelberg, E and
Currie, C, (eds) Too Few to Count: Canadian Women in Conflict with the Law (1987) 47
at 53. Gavigan was quoting Eaton, M, "Mitigating Circumstances: Familiar Rhetoric"
(1983) 11 int'l J Soc L 385; and "Documenting the Defendant: Placing Women in Social
Inquiry Reports" in Brophy, J and Smart, C, (eds) Women in Law: Explorations in Law,
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Thus, the priority accorded to legal aid in criminal law matters may not
benefit women who are participants in the criminal law process (the public
sphere) just as it disadvantages women in family law matters (the private
sphere).
Related to this concern is the need for gender bias research to address the
impact of according priority to legal aid in criminal law matters in the context
of male violence in Canadian society. To the extent that legal aid schemes
give priority to persons charged with violent criminal offences, while denying
resources to victims of such crimes, gender inequality will be reinforced and
exacerbated in terms of access to legal aid services; most accused persons are
men and many of their victims are women. 72 In this context, violence in the
"private" sphere results in legal aid representation for those who must answer
in the "public" sphere (men), while women's concerns for representation (and
protection) remain "private". Such an arrangement suggests that the law's
traditional public/private dichotomy may be used to reinforce differential and
gendered power relationships.
Experience-based methodology: legal aid services for women
From a feminist perspective, the starting point for defining appropriate legal
services for women is women's experiences. Such a methodological approach
means starting from the position which women occupy in society and defining
legal aid services which will assist them 73 Such an approach starkly contrasts
with that of most legal aid schemes which start by extending existing legal
services to legal aid clients, both male and female. As has been suggested, the
latter approach may not meet the needs of women, either because services
defined in terms of paying clients will not necessarily reflect the needs of
women to the same extent as men, or because women's needs for legal aid
services may be different from men's needs for legal aid services, as well as
different from the needs of paying clients. This argument suggests, in
particular, that women may experience poverty for different reasons and in
different circumstances by contrast to men. Thus, according to two American
scholars, female poverty has unique qualities:
While many women are poor for some of the same reasons that men are
poor, such as living in a job-poor area or lacking the necessary skills or
education, much of women's poverty is due to two causes that are basically
unique to women. The first has to do with children, particularly the
economic burdens associated with having the primary responsibility for
children, with or without child support. The second has to do with the labour
market, where women experience discrimination, harassment, and
Family and Sexuality (1985). See also Smart, C, Women, Crime and Criminology: A
Feminist Critique (1976) and "Legal Subjects and Sexual Objects: Ideology, Law and
Female Sexuality" in Brophy and Smart, id.
72 See, eg, Abell, J, "Women, Violence and the Criminal Law: 'It's the Fundamentals of
Being a Lawyer that are at Stake Here"' (1992) 17 Queen's LJ 147; and presented at
Feminist Analysis: Challenging Law and Legal Processes (1992).
73 See Dahl above n9. Dahl's analysis identified inequality for women in terms of money,
time and work. In exploring this inequality, she asserted that it was necessary to do more
than "add on" women's perspectives to existing law to overcome current inequality.
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confinement to low-paying and dead-end jobs often because they are
women.
74
Thus, research directed to defining women's needs for legal aid services,
from the perspective of women, would need to assess the status of women,
relative to men, in Canadian society. Such a research approach would need to
take account of economic disparities in women's work, including both
differential wages and benefits in their paid employment as well as their
unpaid labour in the home. 75 It would also need to document the role of
women in families and the ways in which such roles both limit other
economic opportunities and create gendered burdens of child care and
household responsibilities in ongoing family units, 76 as well as economic
disadvantages when family units break apart.77 As well, such research should
take account of the ways in which discrimination and violence against women
occur in terms of sexual harassment, sexual assault and wife battering, and the
limited success of legal and other measures to combat them.78 In this context,
moreover, research would need to document the extent to which women
currently exercise political, economic and judicial power in decision-making
in Canadian society. 79 Such research would define the nature of the gendered
experiences of women as the basis for considering their needs for legal aid
services.
However, such a research approach would need to encompass not only the
differing gendered experiences of women by contrast with men, but also the
differing ways in which gender is experienced by women in differing
contexts, including the obvious differences of race, class and sexual
orientation, but also taking account of other differences which may affect the
ways in which women experience the world. As Fineman suggested, these
differences may include many other factors such as age, physical
characteristics, marital status, motherhood, sources of income, etc.80 In the
context of research about gender equality and legal aid services, issues of race
and class will, of course, remain particularly important. Thus, while the
disproportionate representation of native women among women accused may
parallel the disproportionate representation of native men among men
accused, gender bias research must confront the relationship of gender and
race to account for the starkly unequal situations of native men and women in
the criminal justice system. 8 1 Similarly, such research must take account of
74 Pearce, D and Ellsworth, K, "Welfare and Women's Poverty: Reform or Reinforcement"
(1990) 16 J Legislation 141, at 142-3.
75 See, eg, Armstrong, P and Armstrong, H, "Women, Family and Economy" in Mandell, N
and Duffy, A, (eds) Reconstructing the Canadian Family (1988). There is significant
research in Canada which documents the poverty of women, relative to men. For some
details, see Welfare Incomes 1990 (1991); and Abner, Mossman and Pickett, above n62.
76 See, eg, Eichler, M, Families in Canada Today (1988).
77 See, eg, Weitzman, L, The Divorce Revolution (1985); and Mossman and MacLean,
"Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New Equality" (1986) 5 Can J Fain L 79.
78 For references, see Mossman, "Shoulder to Shoulder", above n61. See also "Note: Sexual
Harassment in Rental Housing" [1989] Univ Ill LR 175.
79 See "Workshop Reports: Gender" in Hutchinson, A, (ed) Access to Civil Justice (1990) at
281 ff.
80 Fineman, above n7. "Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist
Legal Scholarship".
1993]
SYDNEY LAW REVIEW
the relationship of gender and class to explain the disproportionate number of
women accused who are involved in welfare fraud and prostitution-related
offences. 82
In all these situations, research which documents women's experience(s) is
the first step in the process of designing legal aid services which respond to
women's needs, needs which may sometimes be similar to those of men but
which may also diverge in significant ways.
Gender equality: difference, dominance and disadvantage
In reassessing women's needs for legal aid services and the ways in which
legal aid schemes may be revised to meet them more effectively, gender bias
research must take account of ideas of equality based on difference,
dominance and disadvantage. However, in the short term, such research may
be more useful if it adopts the approach preferred by Canadian courts: the idea
of equality as "disadvantage". Significantly, such a "disadvantage" approach
is entirely consistent with some suggestions by legal aid scholars for defining
entitlement to legal aid services; for example, Peter Hanks has suggested a
model for identifying potential legal aid recipients in Australia utilising a
"social indicator" approach, rather than one based on demands, because the
latter are inevitably reflective of current legal problems. According to Hanks,
the need for legal services has been largely constructed "in terms of the
experiences of individuals involved in the provision of legal services"
reflecting "current delivery patterns":
Many Australian initiatives have been a response to expressed need rather
than measured need. To this extent, they have ignored the inarticulate or
powerless who have not known how to express their needs effectively.
[Such a process] has very little to do with the level of need in the community
[and] largely ensures that resources will go to the aspirant with the loudest
voice. 83
By contrast, Hanks asserted that the use of a "social indicator" approach
would identify those entitled to legal aid services on the basis of two
characteristics: "a need for legal services and a reduced capacity to obtain
those services through the private market". According to Hanks, moreover,
potential recipients would be thus identified from indicators of social
deprivation, including unemployment, geographic isolation, ethnicity, and
dependency on the social security system for income support. 84 Moreover,
while both the social indicator approach and the characteristics identified were
expressed in gender neutral terms, further research might reveal that such an
approach would tend to make legal aid services more available to poor women
because of their greater poverty relative to men, and women's consequential
difficulty in obtaining legal services through the private legal services market.
81 See Adelberg, E, above n61.
82 Ibid.
83 Hanks, P, Social Indicators and the Delivery of Legal Services (1987) at 1-2, citing Cass
and Western, Legal Aid and Legal Need (1980) at 18 and Australian Senate Committee on
Social Welfare, Through a Glass Darkly (1979) at 57-58.
84 Hanks, id at 49. Hanks' approach was strongly supported by the National Legal Aid
Advisory Committee, Funding, Providing and Supplying Legal Aid Services (1989) at 24.
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In the context of Hanks' social indicator approach, women on welfare, women
in rural areas and immigrant women would be regarded as particularly
disadvantaged and in need of legal aid services.
In the context of gender equality jurisprudence in Canada, however, the
essential element in research to design legal aid services for women is a focus
on substantive, and not merely formal, equality. Because judicial decisions
interpreting gender equality claims pursuant to both human rights legislation
and the Charter have defined gender equality as a matter of substance, legal
aid programs must take into account the substantive impact of their coverage
for men and women. In this way, they must meet the standard of gender
equality not just in relation to gender neutral language, but in the substantive
ways in which they respond to women's experiences and legal needs. In this
sense, the extent to which legal aid services meet gender equality objectives
must be tested in terms of outcomes and results. Such suggestions about
redefining the rationale for the provision of legal aid services both challenge
the neutrality of current arrangements and define priorities and objectives for
redesigning legal aid services to meet gender equality goals.
Related concerns: arrangements for providing legal aid services
Legal aid schemes in Canada provide services to clients using a variety of
delivery systems; 85 while some provinces have opted to utilise mainly private
practice lawyers in fee-for-service arrangements, others have adopted
"clinics" as the primary method for providing legal aid services, and some
others have used both: the "mixed delivery" system recommended by the
Canadian Bar Association in its 1987 report. Debate about the utility of these
different kinds of delivery systems has tended to focus mainly on issues of
quality and cost; however the research to date has not yet resulted in clear
conclusions about the relative merits of differing systems because of the
numbers of variables which must be taken into account. 86
From the perspective of gender equality and legal aid services, however,
the issues about delivery systems may be somewhat different. There have
been suggestions, for example, that the services offered by fee-for-service
systems and those offered by clinics are very similar in practice, and that both
delivery systems tend to replicate legal services available to paying clients in
delivering legal aid services.87 Having regard to the analysis in the previous
section about possible differences in the use of legal services generally by
men and women, and also differences in the needs of poor women by contrast
85 For details of delivery system arrangements, see National Legal Aid Liaison Committee,
The Provision of Public Legal Aid Services in Canada: Report to the National Council
(1985). See also Mossman above n50 at 120 ff.
86 Examples of such efforts to compare costs include in British Columbia: Brantingham, P
and Bums, P, The Burnaby, British Columbia Experimental Public Defender Project: An
Evaluation (1982); and in Quebec: Evaluation de l'Aide Juridique (1982).
87 CBA Report on Legal Aid above n85 at 233; the report recommended the use of
fee-for-service and staff clinics and also poverty law clinics; the latter were needed to
provide services in relation to "distinctive" legal problems of the poor, services often
unrecognised by a judicare system. See also Mossman, "Community Legal Clinics in
Ontario" (1983) 3 Windsor YB Access Just 375.
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with poor men, research about gender equality in legal aid delivery systems
must start by questioning the neutrality of current arrangements for providing
legal aid services to men and women, and the extent to which these
arrangements may fail to offer access to legal aid services to women and to
men, in terms of both quality and cost issues.
In the context of gender bias research, there are three issues related to the
process of delivering legal aid services. One is the accessibility of legal aid
services, a concept which has evolved to include ideas about geographic,
linguistic, and physical access, as well as "intellectual" access and time-
liness. 88 In the context of gender equality goals, research would need to take
account of the kinds of services which would most effectively respond to
women's substantive service needs. For example, if women's needs for civil
legal aid services in family law matters were defined as legal aid service
priorities, research would need to consider what kinds of delivery arrange-
ments would be most effective in achieving these objectives; such research
would need to consider both current arrangements for providing legal aid
services, as well as other possible arrangements which might better take
account of women's circumstances (including their familial roles and
potential vulnerability to violence from male partners, for example). As well,
such research could examine issues about appropriate locations for service
providers, their ability to provide referrals for related kinds of needed services
(including advice about housing, childcare, employment opportunities and
educational programs), and the relationship of family law to the legal system
as a whole. 89 In this way, research about accessibility could further the
substantive goals of gender equality in legal aid services.
A second research issue focuses on tariff arrangements in fee-for-service
delivery systems, and the ways in which it may reduce incentives for lawyers
to provide legal aid services in matters other than criminal law cases. In this
context also, gender bias research must start from the assumption that tariff
arrangements may not be neutral, but instead may contain embedded choices
which encourage the delivery of legal aid services in the public sphere while
curtailing those in the private sphere. Thus, research about tariff arrangements
needs to question the ways in which legal aid fees are calculated for criminal
law matters and the impact of these arrangements on remuneration for lawyers
who provide such services, compared with the calculation of fees in civil law
matters and the impact on lawyers who provide these services. There is some
data which suggests that legal aid lawyers are seldom compensated for time
spent on "paper work", an important feature of most family law cases, by
contrast with criminal law matters. Such a choice in tariff arrangements will
thus provide incentives for lawyers to do legal aid work in criminal matters
more frequently than in civil law matters.90
88 See Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry (1987). The report did not address issues of
gender inequality and problems of access for women.
89 Such an approach is somewhat evident in Ellis, D, Ryan, J and Choi, A, Lawyers,
Mediators and the Quality of Life Among Separated and Divorced Women (1988).
90 MacLean, M, A Preliminary Assessment of the OLAP Tariff (Background Paper for
Mossman, "Civil Legal Aid Services in Canada: Policy Options", above n50).
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The third aspect of research about legal aid delivery systems and gender
bias is the choice of service providers: the roles for lawyers and others in
offering legal aid services for women. Research about service providers could
explore a number of related issues. One is the extent to which men and
women who are lawyers are involved in the delivery of legal aid services. To
the extent that there is a preference for criminal legal aid services in Canada,
some preliminary research suggests that male lawyers are more likely to
provide such services,9 1 and thus to obtain the benefits of the tariff for
criminal legal aid services.92 Moreover, the issue of whether it is male or
female lawyers who provide legal aid services in criminal cases is also related
to the issue of which lawyers provide legal aid services in family law or
poverty law matters. Again, some preliminary data suggests that women
lawyers in Ontario are more often involved in providing family law services,
and that they are also more likely to be employed in legal aid (community
clinics and legal aid administrative positions) than men.93
Research about the relationship between male and female lawyers in the
delivery of legal aid services needs to define the relative participation rates for
men and women in respect of different kinds of legal aid services, and then to
explore possible reasons for differing patterns of activity. Differing patterns of
activity for male and female lawyers in providing legal aid services may
suggest that apparently neutral arrangements which provide priority for
criminal law matters result in gender inequality for participating lawyers, in
addition to substantive inequality for women who are legal aid clients. In
addition, however, such research needs to identify the kinds of legal aid work
undertaken by male and female lawyers in "mixed delivery" systems, and to
assess the extent of and reasons for differential participation rates in clinic
employment and in fee-for-service arrangements. Such research may question
whether there are any differences in motivation, in familial roles and respons-
ibilities, or in approaches to problem-solving as possible explanations for
differing roles for men and women lawyers94 in providing legal aid services.95
91 There is some data which suggests that men practise criminal law more frequently than
women: see Transitions in the Ontario Legal Profession (1991) at 16-17. See also
Brockman, J, Evans, D and Reid, K, Feminist Perspectives for the Study of Gender Bias in
the Legal Profession" (forthcoming: 1992) 6 CJWL.
92 Mandel, M The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (1989).
93 The Transitions report, above n91, stated that "18 per cent of women compared with 8 per
cent of men ranked family law as the field of law to which they devoted most time". At 16;
note that this statistic does not separate legal aid services from other services in the family law
area. For details relating to employment with legal aid, see id at 14-15 and Table 4.
In the United States, it has been suggested that the work of legal aid lawyers who do
family law is the most significant contribution to legal aid services, especially in relation
to the substantial number of the poor who are women; see "Challenges Facing Legal
Services in the 1990s: Perspectives on Women and Family Law Advocates" (1988-89) 22
Clearinghouse Rev 457.
94 See Menkel-Meadow, C, "Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal
Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change" (1989) 14 Law and Social Inquiry 289;
Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process" (1985) 1 Berkeley Women's LJ 39; and Menkel-Meadow, 'Toward Another View of
Legal Negotiation: the Structure of Legal Problem-Solving" (1984) 31 UCLA LR 754.
95 In the case of paralegals see lanni, R W, Task Force on Paralegals (1990); and
Noone, M A, "Paralegals and Legal Aid Organizations" (1988) 4 J L Soc Pol 146.
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Thus, these issues about delivering legal aid services so as to meet gender
equality objectives illustrate the close connections between issues of
entitlement and issues of delivery systems; and the ways in which the
concepts of neutrality, the law's division between public and private, the
centrality of women's experiences in defining needs, and a focus on
substantive: not merely formal, equality may inform research projects in
relation to both issues. All of these suggestions for research focus on current
arrangements for legal aid services, and the ways in which they may fail to
meet gender equality objectives. In envisioning gender equality goals for legal
aid services, however, it may also be useful to consider more transformative
research which can revision our conceptions of "access" and "justice" for
women, so as to foster legal aid programs which meet these more imaginative
goals. The final section of this paper explores the conception of this more
transformative research about legal aid services and gender equality.
Revisioning Access to Justice for Women
Effective strategies for gender equality require a reassessment of ends as
well as means. The paradigmatic liberal prescription - equal opportunity -
is a necessary but never sufficient social objective. The ultimate goal is not
simply to ensure women's full participation in organizations that wield
social, economic, and political power; it is rather to change the nature of
those organizations and the way power is distributed and exercised. Our
priority should be to empower women as well as men to reshape the
institutions that are shaping them. At issue is not simply equality between
the sexes, but the quality of life for both of them.96
Deborah Rhode's assertion captures the difference between a search for
gender equality in relation to current legal aid arrangements and a research
approach which goes beyond the present system to revision ideas about
"access" to "justice". In her view, such revisioning means that legal analysis
should replace concern for individual intent with a focus on institutional
practices in discrimination matters; and that "the law's approach to rape,
sexual harassment, and domestic violence must reach beyond the relatively
rare circumstances in which an individual plaintiff comes forward with
conclusive proof of injury". Instead, "analysis must focus more critically on
the cultural conditions that foster sexual abuse and on the law-enforcement
practices that discourage redress". 97 As well, she recommends major efforts to
reduce the cost, complexity and contentiousness of dispute-resolution
processes, and strategies for removing the psychological and financial barriers
of legal processes.
Such recommendations create demands for research about legal aid
services which go beyond the problems of achieving gender equality within
current structures of legal processes, the context in which legal aid services
96 Rhode, above n2 at 320.
97 Ibid. Rhode also notes that most legal theories about justice do not take gender into
account, a point which has also been explored by Okin, S M, Justice, Gender and the
Family (1989); according to Okin, justice for women depends on structural changes to
family life.
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are now provided. In a context which revisions legal processes, there is a need
for gender bias research which reconceptualises legal aid services within a
transformed legal system, a system which offers substantive gender equality
to men and women. In such a context, the research approaches defined in the
previous section would be necessary, but not sufficient, efforts to ensure
gender equality in legal aid services.
Research about gender equality and legal aid services in a context which
revisions law and legal processes must rethink the goals and objectives of
legal aid services in such a context. For example, Christine Boyle's
suggestions for feminist visions in criminal law would require significant
changes in definitions of entitlement for legal aid services and would probably
require some changes in delivery systems as well. 98 Similar changes in other
aspects of law and legal process would necessitate rethinking about the
appropriate arrangements for defining entitlement to legal aid services and for
designing delivery systems. Such research might best be undertaken in terms
of particular reform areas; for example, a research project might reconsider
what legal aid services could be provided, and how they should be organised,
for the victims of family violence (women and children) in the context of
differing options for reforming the criminal law and legal processes relating to
family violence. In doing so, of course, research which has been done about
current arrangements for legal aid services in the context of family violence
(as experienced by women in many different "family" contexts) can usefully
inform both the approach and the conceptualising of research in a revisioned
context. Thus, while it is important to clearly define the scope of revisioned
legal aid research, it is also crucial to understand the connections between
research about current legal aid arrangements and research which takes
account of the revisioning of law and legal processes to achieve gender
equality goals; 99 as Deborah Rhode has asserted, "by broadening our
aspirations to justice, we may come closer to attaining it". 100
Research about gender equality and legal aid services in this revisioned
context also needs to address issues about ways of conceptualising "access"
for women. In this context, research may need to explore the ways in which
women engage in dispute resolution, approaches which seem, on the basis of
women's less frequent participation in courts and other legal processes to
suggest that women may prefer other ways of solving problems. Such
research needs to explore whether men and women have differing expect-
ations of the legal system, or differing expectations in the context of legal aid
98 Boyle, Bertrand, Lacerte-Lamontagne and Shamai, A Feminist Review of Criminal Law
(1985) at 67-69.
99 For an account of the emerging norms about gender, see Razack, S, Canadian Feminism
and the Law (1991); for a somewhat more pessimistic account of the responsiveness of
law to gender equality claims, see Brodsky, G and Day, S, Canadian Charter Equality
Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? (1989). For an analysis of the
ways in which lawyers approach gender equality litigation, see MacDonald, G, "The
Process of Litigating Charter Sex Equality Cases: A Summary of Findings" (1991).
100 Rhode, D, n2 at 321. It may also be significant that the process of investigating gender bias
may itself be a "transformative experience", an assertion which has been made in the context
of gender bias task force activities in the courts in the United States: see Schafran, L H,
"Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation" (1990) 42 Fla LR 181, especially at 202ff.
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services; 10 1 whether women's less frequent participation in legal processes is
the result of differing expectations or socialisation, 102 or whether it relates to
differential access to economic resources; and whether women use other
means of solving problems which might be usefully adopted by men as well.
Thus, research about gender equality and legal aid services in the context of
revisioning "access" to "justice" challenges the fundamental concepts of law
and legal processes. Among these fundamental concepts are the same themes
which provided the framework for analysis in the previous section: the law's
claim to neutrality and the status quo, its division between public and private
spheres, the need to take account of contextualised human experiences rather
than using abstract ideas, and the evolution of conceptions of equality beyond
formality to substance. Thus, the same features of feminist analyses which
informed research approaches in the context of existing arrangements for legal
aid services are equally applicable in the context of revisioning law and legal
processes. In this way as well, there are important connections between
research projects which may be undertaken in these two differing contexts.
In the end, therefore, research about gender equality and legal aid services
must confront Evatt J's assertion about the pervasiveness of gender bias in
legal institutions, its entrenched and insidious qualities, and the continuing
challenge to identify and eradicate it.103 As was suggested in the context of
women's claims for legal status at the turn of the century:
... there is no solution ... except to confront the reality that gender and power
are inextricably linked ... Honestly confronting the barriers of our conceptual
framework may at least permit us to begin to ask more searching and
important questions.104
101 For an interesting analysis of efforts to use divorce processes to "empower" women, see
Joselson, E and Kaye, J, "Pro Se Divorce: A Strategy for Empowering Women" (1983) 1
Law & Jneq J 239.
102 See, eg, the work of Gilligan, C, above n63 and the adaptation of her ideas in the legal
context by Menkel-Meadow, C, above n94.
103 Evatt, above nI.
104 Mossman, "Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes" in Fineman and
Thomadsen, (eds) above n7 at 298.
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